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Abstract

Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989,
the only holiday themed religious display cases decided by the Court on the
grounds on Establishment Clause violations, demonstrate the inadequacies of
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The precedent set out by the
Supreme Court in Lynch v. Donnelly and Allegheny v. ACLU compromise
lower courts’ decision making process. Discrepancy in methods, results, and
opinions threatens the credibility of the Court. This not only confuses the idea
of religious freedom, but it also threatens its very core.
Lynch and Allegheny were intended to clarify Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and provide a standard for interpretation for lower courts to
follow. However, the Court failed to agree upon a legal doctrine that would
achieve these goals. This stems from a deeper conflict over the fundamental
principles underlying the Establishment Clause, which prevents the Court
from providing the guidance necessary to lower court decision-making.
This study examined Circuit Court cases to determine the effect that Lynch
and Allegheny had on lower courts. Compiling circuit court cases involving
disputes of religious symbols displayed in the holiday context and analyzing
the rulings provides a manageable case set that will accurately depict the way
lower courts have responded to the Lynch and Allegheny decisions. Empirical
data shows that cohesiveness within a higher court results in fewer reversals
of the lower court’s decisions. Therefore, circuit courts’ rulings on religious
displays lack uniformity because of the Supreme Court’s inability to provide
consistent guidelines. Evaluation of Circuit Court decisions will provide an
accurate representation of the problems that exist within the appellate court
system.
I examined the methodology used by courts and the outcome reached.
Cases that involved similar displays but resulted in different rulings or cases
that employed different doctrines to come to the same ruling supported the
claim that the Supreme Court has failed to produce guidelines that the lower
courts can effectively apply to a wide range of cases. The 20 cases evaluated
in this study were classified according to the type of display. Two categories
of cases emerged: displays of a single, unattended religious symbol, such as a
solitary crèche or menorah and displays with one or more symbols, such as a
menorah and Christmas tree, included as part of a larger display with clearly
secular symbols, such as a reindeer, candy cane, or banner.
For combined displays, the inclusion of secular objects mitigated the
religious tones of the message perceived by the reasonable observer and were
almost always allowed. For unattended displays, the judges are not equipped
with a clear rule and case outcomes were inconsistent. The overarching issue
still remains that the Court needs to provide better guidance for lower courts.
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1. Introduction

Religious freedom is a defining principle of America’s founding: it
coursed through the colonies and gave rise to the fight for independence. It
originates from the fact that the settlers came to the New World to escape
religious persecution and the problems associated with state sponsored
religion. Justice Hugo Black best describes these consequences in Engel v.
Vitale when he states, “A union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and degrade religion.”1 As a result, it should come as no surprise
that the first article of the Bill of Rights is dedicated to protecting the people
from the harms of government involvement in religion.
The First Amendment to the Constitution holds that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” 2 These phrases guarantee freedom from and of religion;
that is, freedom from state or Federal creation of a national church or
declaration of a national religion, and freedom to practice religion without
interference from state or federal governments.3
Though simple in theory, the application of these principles has not
been straightforward. More questions than answers arise from the few words

1

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, at 431 (1962).
U.S. Constitution, amend. 1.
3
David M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, 6th ed. Vol. 2, (2005), 688. Daniel
Parish, “Private Religious Displays in Public Fora,” The University of Chicago Law Review
61, no. 1 (1994): 254.
2
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dedicated to provide one of the most important constitutional guarantees. As
First Amendment jurisprudence developed, the Supreme Court became
increasingly divided over Establishment Clause interpretation. Justices
disagree on the principles embodied by the Establishment Clause, as well as
the legal doctrine that should be utilized to decide cases. The inability of the
Court to agree on an interpretive framework that is reliable and protective of
religious freedom has serious consequences for Establishment Clause
doctrine.
Religious symbols displayed as a part of holiday scenes is one sect of
Establishment Clause case law that has suffered from inconsistent Supreme
Court guidance. Discord among the Court has serious implications for the
judicial system and for local governments. Discrepancy in methods, results,
and opinions threatens the credibility of the Court. This not only confuses the
idea of religious freedom, but it also threatens its very core. The precedent set
out by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Donnelly and Allegheny v. ACLU
compromise lower courts’ decision making process. They had contrasting
outcomes, a bare majority, and multiple opinions were issued, each proposing
vastly different theories and tests for Establishment Clause cases. Therefore,
the Court’s rulings created inconsistency among circuit, district, and local
courts across the nation. The focus of this study will analyze the effect Lynch
and Allegheny had on the appellate courts by studying the Circuit Court cases
that emerged after Lynch and Allegheny that caused confusion in the appellate

3

courts. In turn, this might help the Supreme Court to grapple with the meaning
of the Establishment Clause in a way that allows for an improvement in
constitutional analyses.
1.1 The Basics: Religious Display Cases
Government sponsorship of religious displays is especially illustrative
of the consequences that stem from disagreement over interpretive
approaches. Religious symbols are a primary mechanism to convey the beliefs
of the religion and are centrally important to the practice of that religion.4
Private displays on public property or publicly funded religious displays raise
the question of whether the government is endorsing a particular religion.
Secularization of religious holidays and the presence of religious pluralism in
America make it difficult to ascertain the message emanating from a range of
different displays, blurring the line between permissible and impermissible.
Nativity scenes, or crèches, that commemorate Christmas, a federal holiday
with both religious and secular aspects, are disputed most frequently. In a
display with secular elements, such as a Santa Claus, and religious elements,
such as a nativity scene depicting the birth of Jesus, it is often hard to establish
the overall message emanating from the display. Thus, the issue becomes
complicated for cities, town, and private entities that wish to erect displays on
public property or using public funds.

4

Joshua D. Zarrow, “Of Crosses and Crèches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly
Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols,” American University Law Review 35 (1986): 477.
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1.2 Framing the Issue
The Supreme Court’s rulings on government sponsorship of religious
displays illustrate the consequences that arise from constitutional
interpretation that lacks a consistent framework. Reliable methods of
interpretation are essential because they facilitate the decision making process
of lower courts and help local governments construct religious displays
without violating the First Amendment.5 Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984 and
County of Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989, the only holiday themed religious
display cases decided by the Court on the grounds on Establishment Clause
violations, demonstrate the inadequacies of the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Bare majorities issued opposite rulings for similar displays,
opinions were numerous and obscure, and the members of the Court
vigorously disagreed with one another.
The Court has failed to adopt a single theory to interpret holiday
display cases, relying on a number of different tests, mainly a lax version of
the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and a neutrality approach. All of these
result in different outcomes when applied to the same case, causing confusion
for lower courts.

5

David Felsen, “Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency
for the Future,” American University Law Review 38 (1989): 395.
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2. Understanding the Meaning of the Establishment Clause
Before examining the Supreme Court precedents and the resulting
appellate court cases, a discussion of Establishment Clause theories and
fundamentals is essential. Several problems emerge in constitutional
interpretation of the religious freedom clauses.
2.1 Tension between the Clauses
First of all, taken together, the clauses point in different directions. The
Establishment Clause requires separation of government and religion,
prohibiting legislation that sponsors one religion over another, or over
irreligion. On the other hand, the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals
from government interference with private religious expression.6 The
Establishment Clause suggests that government should not pass laws that
relate to religious practice in any way. However, the Free Exercise Clause
seems to demand that the government take action to ensure that people are
able to practice their religion freely. As such, the two guarantees are
inherently at odds with one another. For example, legislation that grants
exceptions for people of a certain religion, whose beliefs are at odds with the
law, can be challenged as unconstitutional government endorsement of
religion. However, by failing to provide an exemption, the government can be
charged with violating the Free Exercise Clause on the grounds that it coerced
religious groups to engage in practices contrary to their beliefs.

6

O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, 689.
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2.2 The Language of the Amendment
The broad language creates another source of tension and confusion in
constitutional interpretation. The language of the clause is vague and poses a
multitude of questions: what defines a religion and what constitutes an
establishment thereof? What is a law “respecting” such an establishment? To
what extent must a law affect a person’s religious practice for it to be
considered as infringing on the free exercise guarantee? What are the limits, if
any, on a person’s right to practice his or her religion? Is “no law” an absolute
ban, or are there exceptions? Examples of exemptions from the requirements
of law due to religious reasons considered by the Court extend to jury duty,
public education, military drafts, Social Security, payroll taxes for church
operated schools, salute of the flag in public schools, provision of chaplains in
prison or the military, and a range of others.7 Unfortunately, the text of the
First Amendment provides little insight on the answers to these questions and
the overall unifying meaning of the clauses.8 Additionally, the views of the
Framers of the amendment do not lend themselves to a decisive method of
application to current issues.9

7

Michael W. McConnell, “Accommodation of Religion,” The Supreme Court Review 1985
(1985): 24-26.
8
Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (1986), 84.
9
See Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (1986); Robert L.
Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (1982); Stephen
M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation
of Church and State, (1997).
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2.3 Problems with the Historical Approach
Analyzing the historical context of the First Amendment does not aid
in deciphering the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Rather, it adds
another obstacle to constitutional interpretation. Tension exists because
religious elements are a part of many government institutions even though the
separation of government and religion formed the backbone of the founding
era and is engrained into American culture.
In some instances, the historical record contradicts itself and is
unclear. By relying on opposing remarks by the Framers, people can support
contrasting theories. James Madison and several others wanted to completely
bar Congress from ever passing a law regarding religion. Jefferson agreed
with Madison, and believed that there should be a strict divide between church
and state. Contrary to Madison, Jefferson conceded that this guarantee is not
absolute.10 Beyond the Framers’ specific concern with the establishment of a
national church or religion that would use the publics’ tax money to fund
religious activity, it is unclear how religious freedom would be applied in
other circumstances.
America’s settlement by Protestants escaping religious persecution
assured that religious freedom would be a defining principle underlying the

10

For example, some scholars use original intent to prove that government cannot aid religion
in any way, directly or indirectly (See Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law of Church and
State and the Supreme Court (1962); Levy (1986); and Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and
Freedom (1967)). Others use historical records to support the claim that government can aid
religions in a nondiscriminatory way (See Cord (1982); Gerard V. Bradley, Church-State
Relationships in America (1987)).
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new government. However, as a homogenously Protestant society, the settlers
did not intend the First Amendment to banish every reference to God or
religion by any governmental institution. In fact, many scholars advocate the
view that this religious freedom was solely applicable to Christian, and mostly
Protestant sects.11 Massachusetts, for example, established the
Congregational Church and taxed Quakers, Baptists, and other religious
sects.12 Therefore, government endorsements of Christianity were not
questioned as unconstitutional. Scholars that support this view point to
discrimination against religious minorities, especially Catholics and Jews that
existed well into the late1800s. They also cite the establishment and protection
of Christian practices, such as those implemented in public schools.
Examples of government mixing with religion are widespread: the
Declaration of Independence references a “Creator,” George Washington
declared that November 26th should be a day to give thanks and pray to the
Lord, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison supported “thanksgiving” day
and issued religious proclamations, Congress sessions begin with a prayer,
Court sessions open with “God save the United States and this honorable
Court,” the pledge of allegiance states that the U.S. is “one nation, under
God,” the national slogan is “In God We Trust,” and the religious presence in

11

See generally Douglas Laycock, “‘Nonpreferential’ Aid to Religion: A False Claim about
Original Intent,” William and Mary Law Review (1986); Bruce M. Zessar, “Government
Participation in Holiday Religious Displays: Improving on Lynch and Allegheny,” DePaul
Law Review (1991); S. Feldman (1997); Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest
for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (1995).
12
O’Brien, 689.
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public schools which were commonplace through the 1950s.13 This is not an
exhaustive list of governmental endorsements of religion. Plus, most of these
practices still occur today. Perhaps the most striking examples of government
endorsement of religion come from religious practices in public schools. Bible
readings, teachings of the Bible and Christianity, Christmas and Easter
celebrations, and other religious practices were commonplace in public
schools through the 1950s.
These practices were unchallenged until the 1920s when a massive
influx of immigration changed America’s religious landscape and increased
the presence of religious minorities.14 It was during the immigration boom that
America became characterized as a safe-haven for immigrants seeking
freedom from inequities of all kinds. The Statue of Liberty, now a symbol of
America, is inscribed with a poem that illustrates this idea when it states,
“Give me your tired, your poor, / your huddled masses yearning to breathe
free, / the wretched refuse of your teeming shore.”15 First Amendment rulings
were scarce before this period. In fact, the development of the constitutional
interpretation of the Establishment Clause did not begin until 1947 in the
landmark case Everson v. Board of Education. Against the backdrop of
increased religious pluralism in America and the movement by the Supreme

13

Cord, 223-32; S. Feldman, 222.
S. Feldman, 218-30.
15
Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” (1883), 10-12.
14
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Court toward a preferential treatment of certain civil liberties, including
religious liberty, Establishment Clause doctrine was developed.

3. Theories for Interpreting the Establishment Clause
The inevitable confusion and disagreement over the precise meaning
of the Establishment Clause combined with the importance of religious liberty
necessitates a clear, consistent method to determine cases. Establishment
Clause doctrine is divided into three main approaches: strict separation,
accommodation, and neutrality. Each intends to capture the main principle
embodied by the Establishment Clause, creating a theory that lends itself to
tests and standards that analyze Establishment Clause cases consistently.16 All
of these approaches are based in constitutional logic, but result in different
outcomes when applied to Establishment Clause cases. Criticism of the Court
for failing to reach a substantive approach is abounding.17 The specific tests
used for interpretation emerge from these doctrinal approaches and suffer
from the same shortcomings by failing to fully capture or protect the
guarantees provided by the Establishment Clause.18

16

Mark Tushnet, “The Constitution of Religion,” The Review of Politics (1988): 628.
See Jesse H. Choper, “Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard.”
Minnesota Law Review (1963); Choper, “The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict,” University of Pittsburg Law Review (1980); Choper, “The
Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability,” Journal of Law & Politics (2002); Laycock
(1986).
18
See Steven D. Smith, “Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the ‘No Endorsement’ Test,” Michigan Law Review (1987); Noah Feldman,
“From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause,” California Law
Review (2002); Andrew Rostein, “Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and the
Establishment Clause,” Columbia Law Review (1993).
17
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3.1 Separation
Separationists base their argument on Jefferson’s “wall of separation
between Church and State” and hold that government and religion should be
entirely distinct.19 Separationists are split according to their interpretation of
the historical record in regards to the legality of laws that have an indirect or
incidental effect of aiding religion. The “softer” view of separation allows
legislation that has a secondary effect that aids religions, as long as it does not
discriminate between religions.20 Others favor a high wall approach, which
bans legislation that has an indirect, incidental, or secondary effect of aiding
or inhibiting religion.
Strict separationists base their “no aid” argument on historical analysis
and the original intent of the Framers.21 Per this approach, laws which have
the primary or indirect effect of aiding or inhibiting any religion are
prohibited.22 This would create an absolute ban on public displays of religious
symbols, government programs in parochial schools, legislative chaplains,
Congressional prayer, the Supreme Court’s reference to God in its opening
statement, and government aid to religious organizations as a part of social
19

Levy, 181.
Frank Guliuzza, III, Over the Wall: Protecting Religious Expression in the Public Square,
(2000), 66.
21
See Pfeffer (1967); Levy (1986); N. Feldman (2002); Norman Dorsen, and Charles Sims,
“The Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment,” University of Illinois Law Review (1985);
Daan Braveman, “The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality,”
Maryland Law Review (1986); Steve Gey, “Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the
Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause,” Columbia Law Review (1981); William
Van Alstyne, “Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall: A Comment on
Lynch v. Donnelly,” Duke Law Journal (1984).
22
Shahin Rezai, “County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause
Analysis,” American University Law Review (1990): 504.
20
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services, health care, and similar programs.23 This doctrine was written into
constitutional history by Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing Township when he states, “The First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach.”24
Proponents of the softer version of separation are against the “no-aid”
principle advocated by strict separationalists, criticizing it for being too
absolute and inflexible. They hold that a wall of separation does not preclude
secular legislation that provides nonpreferential aid.25 Nonpreferentialists
believe government must be nondiscriminatory and not favor one religion
over another when it provides aid.26
Opponents to the separation doctrine argue that some intermingling of
government and religion is inevitable, and a strict separation doctrine is
unrealistic for Establishment Clause interpretation. Chief Justice Berger
supports this view in Walz v. Tax Commission in 1970: “No perfect or
absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion
Clauses is an involvement of sorts -- one that seeks to mark boundaries to

23

Guliuzza, 66.
330 U.S. 1 at 18.
25
Cord, 15.
26
See Cord (1982); Bradley (1987).
24
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avoid excessive entanglement.”27 Additionally, it is not in accordance with
original intent of the Framers.28
3.2 Accommodation
Accommodationists highlight the significance of religion to America
in holding that the Establishment Clause permits legislation that benefits
religion, as long as the government does not discriminate among different
religions.29 They reject the importance given to original intent by
separationists and question its relevance in today’s society. They suggest that
America is a religious nation and recognizing the significance of faith-based
organizations in American culture enhances religious freedom. Michael
McConnell embodies this view in his paper “Accommodation of Religion,”
when he states:
[A]ccommodation of religion is consistent with the political theory
underlying the Constitution…an emphasis on the central value of
religious liberty can generate principles for distinguishing between
legitimate accommodation and unwarranted benefits to religion.30
A principle of accommodation enhances religion and accounts for the
religious pluralism that pervades American society.
Accommodationists oppose strict neutrality because the inherent
tension between the two clauses likely results in restriction, and even

27

Walz v. Tax Commission 397 U.S. 664, at 670 (1970).
See Cord (1982); S. Feldman (1997); Donald Beschle, “The Conservative as a Liberal: The
Religion Clauses, Liberal Authority, and the Approach of Justice O’Connor,” University of
Notre Dame (1987).
29
See McConnell (1985).
30
McConnell, 59.

28
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violation, of the liberties guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.31 This view
was applied in Walz v. Tax Commission, evidenced by Chief Justice Berger’s
when stating, “…the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other.32 This approach is favored by Chief Justice Burger,
Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and O’Connor. Opponents reject this approach
because the increased flexibility it allows results in less consistent and
predictable analysis.33
3.3 Neutrality
The third approach, neutrality, purports that the Establishment Clause
requires that government does not discriminate among religions or between
religion and irreligion, obliging that government laws that affect religion must
be based on secular purposes.34 Justice Black outlined the doctrine in Everson:
“[T]he First Amendment…requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them.”35

31

Rezai (1990).
Walz, 397 U.S. 668-69 (1970).
33
Felsen (1989).
34
See Beschle (1987); Cord (1982); Arnold H. Loewy, “Rethinking Government Neutrality
Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice
O’Connor’s Insight,” North Carolina Law Review (1986): Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
(1986).
35
Everson, 330 US 1 at 18 (1947).
32
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Several variations exist. In its most absolute form, strict neutrality bars
laws that aid religious organizations directly or indirectly, except when
covering a welfare grant applicable to everyone regardless of their religious
beliefs, or lack thereof.36 Professor Kurland is a well known advocate of this
position, which prohibits accommodation.37 Benevolent neutrality, on the
other hand, tolerates accommodation. Chief Justice Berger describes the
benefits of benevolent neutrality over strict neutrality in Walz:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an
absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of
these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited. Short of those
expressly proscribed governmental acts, there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.38
Criticisms stem from the lack of precise methods to define the neutral
categories.39 Modified versions of these theories, as well as entirely different
approaches, have been suggested as well.40

36

Gey (1981).
Kurland (1962).
38
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (1970).
39
Tushnet (1988).
40
For example: the political equality theory (N. Feldman 2002); the symbolic approach
(William Marshall 1986); two track approach, (Laurence Tribe 1988); unitary reading of both
clauses with less emphasis on the Establishment Clause, (Choper 1980 and Kurland 1962); no
solution is possible and the quest for such an approach degrades religious freedom (Smith
1995); pluralist approach (Mark de Wolfe Howe 1965).
37
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3.4 Interpretive Tests
Over the past sixty years, the Court has regularly heard Establishment
Clause cases, producing a number of tests to guide constitutional
interpretation. However, they failed to steer decision making because they
were used erratically and frequently changed.41 This is evidenced by the
Lemon test, a three prong test that emerged from the majority opinion in
Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971. Lemon v. Kurtzman involved a challenge to a
Pennsylvania state law that the Court struck down for violating the principle
that government should not endorse religion.42 The Lemon test holds that a
law must have a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion.43 It allowed the Burger Court to move away from a principle of strict
separation, a doctrine that the Court felt was unsound.44 Instead, the Court
moved toward accommodating religion, which is highlighted by Justice
Burger’s opinion: “Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that
the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship.”45 However, Lemon has not been used steadily, as justices
disagree on its application. As a result, an ad hoc approach has emerged and

41

Felsen, 395; Rezai, 503.
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
43
Id. At 612-13.
44
Id. at 615.
45
Id. at 614.
42
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rulings are often contradictory. In response to this, a number of variations to
Lemon have been proposed by the Court.
3.4.1 The Endorsement Test
Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test is the most influential test put
forth from the bench in response to Lemon. The test modifies the purpose and
effect prong of the Lemon test and “requires courts to examine whether
government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually
conveys a message of endorsement.”46 O’Connor advocates the practicality of
this test when she states:
The endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it gives
to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect. In
this country, church and state must necessarily operate within the same
community. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that the
secular interests of government and the religious interests of various
sects and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and
combine.47
She warns against reliance on Lemon because although it is useful, it does not
fully embrace the constitutional principles at the heart of the Establishment
Clause. She purports that the Endorsement Test does embody religious liberty
because it “does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or
from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion
or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”48

46

Wallace v. Jaffre 472 US 38, at 69 (1985).
Id. at 69.
48
Id. at 70.
47
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Despite the Court’s increased use of O’Connor’s test, especially in
religious symbol cases, Establishment Clause jurisprudence lacks
standardization and continually receives criticism from legal scholars.49 This
failure is especially evident in the Court’s rulings on religious displays in the
public forum.

4. The Establishment Clause and Religious Display Cases
4.1 Lynch v. Donnelly
4.1.1 Facts of the Case
Lynch v. Donnelly, decided in 1984, considered the constitutionality of
the City of Pawtucket’s Christmas display, located in a park not owned by the
City. The display consisted of the crèche, a Christmas tree, a “Seasons
Greetings” banner, a Santa Claus House, reindeer pulling a sleigh, candystriped poles, carolers, colored lights, and cut-outs of clowns, teddy bears, and
an elephant, and other figures associated with the Christmas season.50 The
crèche included the traditional figures, such as baby Jesus, Mary, and
Joseph.51 The figures, which were owned by the city and ranged from fives
inches to life size, had been included in the display for over 40 years and no

49

See Braveman (1986); Choper (1963); Choper (1980); Carole Kagan, “Squeezing the Juice
from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the Establishment Clause,” Northern Kentucky
Law Review (1995); Kurland (1962); Kurland (1985); Levy (1986); W. Marshall (1986);
Rostein (1993); Tushnet (1988); Tribe (1988); Cord (1982); Laycock (1986); Van Alystene
(1984); Gey (1981); N. Feldman (2002); Dorsen and Sims (1985); Beschle (1987); Smith
(1987).
50
Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 at 671 (1984).
51
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (1984).
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longer created expenses for the City.52 Its inclusion was challenged as a
violation of the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court, reversing the
decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the display did not
violate the Establishment Clause.53
4.1.2 The Decision
In a bare 5-4 majority, written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held
that the nativity scene was constitutional due to the physical context of the
scene as part of a display celebrating the holiday season. Chief Justice Burger
argued against the separation of church and state, citing the many instances of
official acknowledgements of religion. He argued that “If the presence of the
crèche in this display violates the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms
of taking official note of Christmas, and of our religious heritage, are equally
offensive to the Constitution.”54 Instead, he wrote that the Constitution
“affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all
religions, and forbids hostility toward any.”55 Though evaluating the display
using the Lemon test, Chief Justice Burger noted the Court’s “unwillingness to
be confined to any single test of criterion in this sensitive area.”56 He argued
that the crèche had a secular purpose because the scene must be viewed in the
context of the holiday season as a depiction of the history of Christmas.57 In

52

Id at. 671.
Id. at 668, 672.
54
Id. at 679.
55
Id. at 673.
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Id. at 679.
57
Id. at 668, 679.
53
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viewing the scene in this manner, the primary purpose did not advance any
religion, but rather celebrated the historical aspect.58 Finally, the scene did not
create excessive government entanglement because there was little
administrative interaction and a minor cost. With the Lemon test satisfied, the
Chief Justice concluded by saying, “Any notion that these symbols pose a real
danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed.”59
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion suggesting a new way to
view Establishment Clause doctrine, unsure that the Lemon test embodies its
fundamental principles. She held that it “prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the
political community.”60 Government violates the Establishment Clause under
this modified doctrine by “communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”61 As applied to the crèche in Lynch,
she argues that its inclusion in the display does not promote religion, but
rather the “celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols.”62
The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, argued that neutrality, not
accommodation, is at the heart of the Establishment Clause. He criticized the
application of the Lemon test by the majority, and showed that the display
would not pass a vigorous application of the test.63 The crèche did not have a
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Id. at 668, 681.
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Id. at 668, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
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Id. at 692
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Id. at 691.
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Id. at 703.
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secular purpose, and the goals of the City with regards to celebrating the
holiday could be accomplished with the other secular Christmas symbols.64
The primary effect of the crèche promoted Christianity. Finally, the display
fostered excessive government entanglement with religion by potentially
causing other religions to push to have their symbols included, leading the
City to become intertwined with many religious groups.65 Justice Brennan
also criticized the majority’s historical argument and the link to official
acknowledgements of religion to justify the crèche.66 He asserts that official
acknowledgements of religion, such as Congressional prayer, which have
existed since the founding, might be legitimate, but “the development of
Christmas as a public holiday is a comparatively recent phenomenon.”67
4.1.3 Problems for Future Analysis
The use of such a detail-specific analysis without providing an
overarching doctrinal approach to interpretation led to confusion. Though the
majority made clear that the holiday context made the Lynch display
permissible, they failed to address the constitutionality of displays in other
contexts, a wide range of which were bound to appear in lower court cases.
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4.2 County of Allegheny v. ACLU
In an attempt to elucidate the Lynch ruling, the Court heard County of
Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989.68 Unfortunately, this only added to existing
confusion.
4.2.1 Facts of the Case
Allegheny involved two privately owned holiday displays located on
public property in Pittsburgh. The first was a crèche located on the Grant
Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse.69 The display included two
banners, one noting ownership by the Holy Name Society and the other
featuring a Latin phrase which translates to “Glory to God in the Highest.”70
The second display was an 18’ tall Menorah, located outside the City-County
Building next to a 45’ tall Christmas tree decorated with lights and ornaments,
and a sign reading “Salute to Liberty.”71 A photograph of the displays can be
seen below, in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.

68

George M. Janocsko, “‘Beyond the “Plastic Reindeer Rule’: The Curious Case of County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,” Duquesne Law Review 28 (1990): 451.
69
County of Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989).
70
Alleghney, 492 U.S. at 585 (1989).
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Id. at 573.
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Figure 4.1. Crèche found to violate the Establishment Clause in Allegheny.
Source: Hampton Dellinger, “Words Are Enough” (1997): 1722, Image 4.

Figure 4.2. Menorah found not to violate the Establishment Clause in
Allegheny.
Source: Hampton Dellinger, (June 1997): 1722, Image 4.
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4.2.2 The Decision
The Court was even more divided in the Allegheny decision, ruling 5-4
that the crèche violated the Establishment clause and 6-3 that the Menorah
was permissible. Five separate opinions were written for the crèche case, each
providing different frameworks for interpretation. No majority opinion was
given for the Menorah display. With only a partial majority opinion written
for the crèche display and each opinion offering different interpretive
approaches, the Allegheny precedent becomes exceedingly confusing.
Justice Blackmun wrote the partial majority opinion, joined by Justices
O’Connor and Stevens, adopting Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test first
laid out in her concurrence in Lynch.72 He emphasized the primary effect
prong of the Lemon test, holding that the core of the Establishment Clause “at
the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.’”73 As applied to
the displays in the case, the majority found that the crèche, especially when
accompanied by the banner, served as a government endorsement of
Christianity. Justice Blackmun was not joined by other justices for his opinion
on the Menorah. Focusing on the context of the Menorah, next to the
Christmas tree and the “Salute to Liberty” sign, he argued that the display
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465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (1989).
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“recognizes that Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same holiday season,
which has attained a secular status in our society.”74
Though a majority agreed that the endorsement analysis was the
correct principle and signed on to Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the crèche,
they disagreed on how to apply the test. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
emphasized the need to view the circumstances of a certain action to
determine whether it endorses or disapproves of religion.75 She focuses on the
effect for a “reasonable observer” viewing the scene, and agrees that the
crèche endorsed religion while the Menorah scene provided a message of
“cultural diversity…and tolerance.”76 In her concurrence, she develops and
justifies her “endorsement test.” She claims that a government action that
endorses religion or disapproves of other beliefs or non-belief has the
“impermissible effect of ‘mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community.’”77
Justices Stevens and Brennan argued for invalidation of both displays.
Justice Stevens concurred with the crèche and dissented with the Menorah,
arguing for a “strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on
public property.”78 This prohibits displays with a non-secular context,
providing a strict interpretation of the endorsement test. Following a neutrality
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approach, Justice Stevens’ test looks at the object itself and bars all religious
symbols from being displayed by the government.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent and joined by Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, and White, advanced a “non coercion” principle.79 He states that
government accommodation is part of America’s cultural and political
heritage, but that it is limited such that government cannot coerce support of
religion and government cannot benefit religion in a way that benefits are
great enough to establish a state church.80 Under this non-coercion principle,
both displays were constitutional because the City was participating in the
“tradition of government accommodation and acknowledgement of religion
that has marked our history from the beginning.”81
4.2.3 Problems for Future Analysis
This is striking and demonstrative of the deficiencies in Establishment
Clause understanding and analysis. A 5-4 division speaks measure by itself,
but in addition, five justices put forth approaches for analysis that rest on
opposing constitutional principles and highlight different meanings of
religious freedom. Further still, the analysis used resulted in opposite rulings
for seemingly similar displays. Instead of providing a rule for interpretation,
the Court established an “indeterminate analytical framework where
everything is relevant but nothing is singularly decisive.”82 In effect, the Court
79
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has guaranteed confusion among judges and local governments, which causes
increased litigation and inconsistency in lower court rulings.

5. Data and Research Design
5.1 Questions of Study
Do Lynch and Allegheny actually produce the degree of lower court
chaos that many scholars depict? Does variance come from a small number of
courts issuing conflicting decisions or are all courts similarly confused? When
courts issue rulings that conflict with the precedent of the Supreme Court or of
other lower courts, what causes the clash? That is, what parts of the Lynch and
Allegheny decisions are most perplexing? In this analysis, I intend to embark
on a review of the Lynch and Allegheny progeny in order to provide
substantive answers to these questions.
5.2 Judicial Theory
As the highest authority in the judicial system, the Supreme Court
plays an important role in deciding many of America’s most divisive issues.
However, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court is part of a
three-tiered federal judicial system that includes thirteen courts of appeals and
ninety-four district courts.83 The Supreme Court can hear a limited number of
cases each year, so it relies heavily on lower courts to enforce its decisions
and comply with its opinions when deciding cases. Appellate courts play a
83
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key role in ensuring implementation and consistency of federal law.
Understanding the way these courts interact and its influence on judicial
decision making is essential in order to analyze the effects of Lynch and
Allegheny on lower courts and determine the causes for inconsistent rulings in
circuit and district Courts.
Traditionally, legal scholars explain the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the Circuit and District Courts using the hierarchical
model, based from the principal-agent theory, in which the Supreme Court is
the principal and enacts policies which the lower courts, as the agents, must
implement.84 More basically, the system is a pyramid and the Supreme Court
sits on the top, with circuit courts in the middle and the district forming the
base.85 The doctrine of vertical precedent, that lower courts are obliged to
follow the decisions and methods of higher courts, is especially powerful in
this model.86 There is considerable research that supports this model, showing
lower courts implement precedent set out by the Supreme Court based on the
fear that the Court can review and overturn their decisions.87 The Court
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See Elise Borochoff,, “Lower Court Compliance with Supreme Court Remands,” Touro Law
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monitors rulings of circuit courts, which monitor district courts in order to
ensure consistency. Reversal corrects an errant ruling and signals the
preferences of the superior court to lower courts. But in the case of religious
displays, the Supreme Court’s precedent has not served to signal the justice’s
preferences regarding Establishment Clause interpretation.
The research conducted by a group of scholars in support of the
interaction model, which focuses on the Supreme Court’s dependence on the
lower courts to enforce federal law, help to explain the effect of
cohesiveness.88 The Supreme Court can decide a small number of cases each
year, leaving the circuit court as the highest authority for the majority of
litigation. Empirical data shows that cohesiveness within a higher court results
in fewer reversals of the lower court’s decisions.89 For example, when a
circuit issues consistent rulings, district courts are less likely to issue an errant
decision. However, circuit courts’ rulings on religious displays lack
uniformity because of the Supreme Court’s inability to provide consistent
guidelines. Per this theory, this leads to increased litigation and the possibility
for significant discrepancies across the U.S. based on a particular circuit’s
interpretation of the Lynch and Allegheny precedent.

Reactions to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent,” Journal of Politics 64 (2002); Songer,
Segal, and Cameron (1994).
88
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In order to analyze the effects of Lynch and Allegheny lower courts, it
is important to understand the way incoherency and confusion in the Supreme
Court affects the decision making process of lower court judges. Judicial
decision making is described by the legal model, which asserts that judges are
neutral decision makers who make decisions based on precedent, the
Constitution, and relevant statutes.90 In general, research shows that lower
court compliance with precedent is correlated to coherency, persuasiveness,
and support by the Court.91 This is crucial to an analysis of the effects of
Lynch and Allegheny on lower court rulings because it suggests that when
faced with inconsistent precedent and confusion regarding the Constitutional
principles, judges will have to decide cases on other grounds. The legal model
does not account for the outcomes in Establishment Clause cases, in which
there is a high level of judicial discretion because judges need determine how
to interpret the vague text of the First Amendments. Judicial preferences and
ideologies will govern the doctrinal method chosen to interpret a case, which
has a considerable effect on the case’s outcome.
In response to the legal model’s shortcomings, scholars began
questioning its validity as early at the 1930s, criticizing its disregard for
90
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judicial discretion in many cases.92 Scholars created the attitudinal model,
which maintains that judges make decisions to further their own political or
ideological goals and maximize their utility.93 The Attitudinal Model purports
that the values held by a judge play an important role in the decision. It was
originally formulated by Glendon Schubert and applied by Jeffrey Segal and
Harold Spaeth.94
5.3 Research Design
This study analyzes circuit court cases to determine the extent to
which disagreement exists in the lower courts and the reasons for confusion. I
will examine the methodology used by courts and the outcome reached. Cases
that involved similar displays but resulted in different rulings or cases that
employed different doctrines to come to the same ruling will support the claim
that the Supreme Court has failed to produce guidelines that the lower courts
can effectively apply to a wide range of cases. Then, a detailed case study will
seek to explain the most problematic aspects of the Court’s rulings.
The ninety four district courts, thirteen circuit courts, Supreme Court,
and state court systems create the universe of religious display cases, a set too
92
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large for this analysis. Compiling circuit court cases involving disputes of
religious symbols displayed in the holiday context and analyzing the rulings
provides a manageable case set that will accurately depict the way lower
courts have responded to the Lynch and Allegheny decisions. This is the most
reliable way to narrow down the data because of the nature of the judicial
system. That is, the Supreme Court can decide only a small number of cases
each year, leaving the circuit courts as the highest authority for the majority of
litigation. Therefore, circuit courts become the court of last resort for most
litigation due to the restrictions of the Supreme Court. As such, the ruling of
the Circuit Court are the final say on almost all cases involving displays of
religious symbols in the holiday context. Evaluation their decisions will
provide an accurate representation of the problems that exist within the
appellate court system.
The case sets to be examined were created using Sheppard’s Citations,
a service available through the LexisNexis database that uses the code given
to federal decisions to generate a list of all cases that reference the decision. It
also gives prior and subsequent history of the case and provides a “Signal
Legend” that aids in choosing cases for review and then classifying and
organizing cases. After doing a key word search for Appellate and Supreme
Court cases that involved religious displays disputed under the Establishment
Clause, I acquired a substantial list of cases. I removed cases that did not
involve displays of religious symbols in the holiday context. I inputted the
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codes into the Sheppard Citation service to expand my list of cases. I also read
through each case looking for cases that the majority and dissent cited as
support that involved displays of religious symbols in the holiday context.
In this way, I generated a list of cases out of the entire universe of
religious symbol Establishment Clause cases. I initially organized and
examined the cases into three sets of Circuit Court rulings on religious
displays: the first included Circuit Court rulings on religious display cases
prior to the Lynch ruling in 1984; the second included religious display cases
decided by Circuit Courts between the Lynch ruling in 1984 and the Allegheny
ruling in 1989; the third included religious display rulings after the Allegheny
ruling in 1989. I eliminated cases that were decided before Lynch because
they are not relevant to a discussion of how Lynch and Allegheny affected
lower court rulings. Although the courts were unsure as to how to decide these
types of cases before Lynch, they were similarly confused after the Lynch
ruling. Instead of providing clarification, the Court further confused
Establishment Clause doctrine, resulting in even more problems for lower
courts.95
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It is usually this type of division that leads to a case’s review by the Supreme Court. Lower
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Then, I considered the details of the display, the outcome of the case,
unanimity or lack thereof by the panel of judges, and the opinion(s) issued.
The details leading to the litigation and the outcome itself often determine the
source of inconsistency and how often rulings contradict those of other
circuits. Most circuit cases consist of a panel of three judges and most
opinions that circuit courts issue are unanimous. The number of opinions and
issuance of more than one opinion reveal the level of disagreement among that
particular circuit’s judges. A high presence of split decisions will speak to the
confusion across one geographical region, or possibly across several,
stemming from the Supreme Court’s rulings. The opinion itself will uncover
the parts of the Court’s precedent that are most problematic.
The list of cases examined can be found in Appendix 1.

scene on public school property); Opinions of the Justices, 108 NH 97, 228 A.2d 161 (1967)
(plaques with the words "In God We Trust" in public schoolrooms); State ex rel Singlemann
v. Morrison, 57 So. 2d 238 (La Ct App) (statue of nun in public park); Gilfillan v. City of
Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) (city's design and construction of platform,
including large Latin cross, for papal visit found to have religious purpose); Citizens
Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. Denver, 481 F. Supp. 522 (D.C. Colo.
1979), (nativity scene on county property erected with religious purposes); Fox v. City of Los
Angeles, 22 Cal.3d 792, 150 Cal.Rptr. 867, 587 P.2d 663 (1978) (lighted cross on city hall
found to have religious purpose); but see Eugene Sand and Gravel Company v. City of
Eugene, 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338 (1976) (cross erected as veteran's war memorial had
secular purpose); Allen v. Hickel, 138 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 424 F.2d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(crèche in Christmas pageant on federal parkland).
Case list compiled from: Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene 558 P.2d 338, (Or.
1976) and ACLU of Georgia v. Rabun 698 F.2d 1098; (11th Cir. 1983).
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5.4 Limitations of the Study
In no way is this study a comprehensive review of Establishment
Clause case history, or even Establishment Clause doctrine with regards to
religious symbols. I seek to analyze one sub-section of Establishment Clause
cases, religious displays in the holiday context, in order to determine the
effects of the unclear precedent of Lynch and Allegheny; the areas of the
Supreme Court precedent are most troublesome for appellate courts, and the
issues that the courts disagree with across circuits. By using a case study
method, I will focus on analyzing opinions. This is not an empirical study of a
large number of cases. That being said, the case set represents most, if not all,
holiday display cases between 1984 and 2007, and the findings will be
broadly applicable to other areas of Establishment Clause dispute.

6. Results and Findings
Lynch and Allegheny were intended to clarify Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and provide a standard for interpretation for lower courts to
follow. However, the Court failed to agree upon a legal doctrine that would
achieve these goals. This stems from a deeper conflict over the fundamental
principles underlying the Establishment Clause, which prevents the Court
from providing the guidance necessary to lower court decision-making. The
data confirms that the Circuit Courts are divided regarding how to apply the
detail-specific rulings of Lynch and Allegheny to the wide range of displays
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that are brought to the Appellate Courts. Justice Brennan predicted this
problem in his dissent in Lynch when he stated:
[T]he Court reaches an essentially narrow result which turns largely
upon the particular holiday context in which the city of Pawtucket's
nativity scene appeared. The Court's decision implicitly leaves open
questions concerning the constitutionality of the public display on
public property of a crèche standing alone, or the public display of
other distinctively religious symbols such as a cross.96
Indeed, there is no consistency across circuits. Often, nearly identical displays
are allowed by some courts and prohibited by others.
6.1 The Big Picture
The data confirms that the circuits issue inconsistent rulings for similar
displays. Table 6.1 presents the data that provides evidence of this pattern. It
lists the cases chronologically and includes a variety of information on the
background of the case and the ruling. The “Rulings” Column immediately
shows this disjointedness; with decisions flip flopping back and forth from
permissible to impermissible.
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Table 6.1. Circuit Court Rulings, Compiled by Year.
Case

Year

Circuit

Description of the Display

Ruling

Doctrine

McCreary v. Stone

1984

Second

Crèche in public park decorated with lights, ornaments,
and Christmas music

Crèche
allowed

Lemon

ACLU v. Birmingham

1986

Sixth

Crèche on lawn of City Hall

Crèche
prohibited

Lynch

ACLU v. St Charles

1986

Seventh

Cross on top of the fire department, 35 feet high and 75
feet above street level (as part of a Christmas display
including lit trees, snowflakes, reindeer, Santa Clause)

Cross
prohibited

Schempp,
historical
analysis of the
Cross

AJC v. Chicago

1987

Seventh

Crèche in city hall (argued as part of bigger scene-but
court saw it as self contained)

Crèche
prohibited

Lemon

Kaplan v. City of
Burlington

1989

Second

16 ft Menorah in front of city hall (unattended, solitary) Menorah
prohibited

Allegheny
(reasonable
observer)

Mather v. Mundelein

1989

Seventh

Nativity scene on public park with Christmas tree,
Santa, snowmen, etc

Crèche
allowed

AJC v.
Chicago, Lynch

Smith v. Albemarle

1990

Forth

Crèche on front lawn of County Office Building with
sign reading "Sponsored by Charlottesville Jaycees"

Crèche
prohibited

Allegheny
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Case

Year

Circuit

Description of the Display

Ruling

Doctrine

ACLU v. Wilkinson

1990

Sixth

Stable and manger without figurines located on capitol
grounds (30ft decorated Christmas tree 100 located
yards away, along with decorated street lamp posts,
lighted trees, and ribbons)

Stable
allowed

Allegheny
(reasonable
observer),
Lemon

Doe v. Clawson

1990

Sixth

Crèche on front lawn of city hall with evergreen trees
with lights, gifts, bows, Santa, and a "Noel" sign

Crèche
allowed

Allegheny
(Blackmun)

Chabad-Lubavitch of
Vermont v. Burlington

1991

Second

Menorah in park at city hall alongside a secular display
as part of a combined holiday display

Menorah
allowed

Allegheny,
Kaplan

Americans United v.
Grand Rapids

1992

Sixth

20 ft Menorah in a downtown public plaza

Menorah
allowed

Reasonable
observer

Kreisner v. San Diego

1993

Ninth

8 religious scenes from the New Testament
accompanied by biblical passages, in a public park

Scene
allowed

Lemon,
Allegheny

Chabad-Lubavitch of
Georgia v. Miller

1993

Eleventh

15 foot tall Menorah in plaza in front of State Capital
building with sign "Happy Chanukah from Chabad of
Georgia"

Menorah
permitted

No-preference,
reasonable
observer,
Widmar

Creatore v. Trumbull

1995

Second

Crèche next to Christmas tree and menorah on town
green

Crèche
allowed

Allegheny
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Case

Year

Circuit

Description of the Display

Ruling

Doctrine

AJC v. Beverly Hills

1996

Ninth

27 ft Menorah in public park near city hall with a sign
saying "This Menorah is Sponsored by Chabad of
California. It is Not Funded or Sponsored by the City
of Beverly Hills"

Menorah
prohibited

Unclearreferences
numerous
precedents

Elewski v. Syracuse

1997

Second

Crèche with a banner that says "Glory to God in the
Highest" at base of a 50 foot illuminated tree in a
downtown public square decorated with ornaments.
Across from this square is a Menorah display.

Crèche
allowed

Allegheny
(reasonable
observer)

ACLU v. Schundler

1999

Third

Crèche and menorah on city land in front of city hall
modified to include secular symbols

Modified
display
allowed

Allegheny
(reasonable
observer)

ACLU v. Florissant

1999

Eighth

Crèche at City Civic Center (part of display with
"Seasons Greetings" sign, reindeer, candy canes,
presents, snowman

Crèche
allowed

Allegheny

Wells v. City and
County of Denver

2001

Tenth

Poem (against religion) petitioned to be included in a
display of a Crèche, tin soldiers, Christmas tree, Santa,
snowmen on steps of City and County building

Not require
to display
poem

Citizens
Concerned,
Lemon

Skoros v. NY

2006

Second

Crèche (in school where menorah and star and crescent
were allowed)

Not required
to display
crèche

Lemon
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To interpret these apparent inconsistencies and evaluate their cause,
the 20 cases evaluated in this study can be classified according to the type of
display. Two categories of cases emerge from the data presented in Table 6.1.
The first group includes displays of a single, unattended religious symbol,
such as a solitary crèche or menorah. The second group encompasses displays
with one or more symbols, such as a menorah and Christmas tree, included as
part of a larger display with clearly secular symbols, such as a reindeer, candy
cane, or banner. These groups are distinctly different and provide crucial
insight into analyzing the effects of Lynch and Allegheny.
6.2 Unattended Displays
Twelve cases fall under the category of unattended displays, as listed
below by circuit. Table 6.2 displays these cases in chronological order and
reveals that a vast portion of the reported inconsistency comes from this
group.
McCreary v. Stone (2nd Cir. 1984) 739 F.2d 716
Elewski v. City of Syracuse (2nd Cir. 1997) 123 F.3d 51
Smith v. County of Albemarle (4th Circuit 1989) 895 F.2d 953
ACLU v. Birmingham (6th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 1561
Americans United v. City of Grand Rapids (6th Circuit 1992) 980 F.2d 1538
American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 120
American Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills (9th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 379
Kaplan v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 1024
Skoros v. New York (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1
Kreisner v. City of San Diego (9th Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 775
Chabad-Lubavitch of GA v. Miller (11th Cir. 1993) 5 F.3d 1383
ACLU v. Wilkinson (6th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1098
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Table 6.2. Circuit Court Rulings on Unattended Displays Religious Symbols.
Case

Year

Circuit

Vote

Description of the Display

Ruling

Doctrine

McCreary V. Stone

1984

Second

3:0

Crèche in public park decorated with lights, ornaments,
and Christmas music (seen at single self contained)

Crèche
allowed

Lemon

ACLU v. Birmingham

1986

Sixth

2:1

Crèche on lawn of City Hall

Crèche
prohibited

Lynch

AJC v. Chicago

1987

Seventh

2:1

Crèche in city hall (argued as part of bigger scene-but
court saw it as self contained)

Crèche
prohibited

Lemon

Kaplan v. City of
Burlington

1989

Second

2:1

16 ft Menorah in front of city hall

Menorah
prohibited

Allegheny
(reasonable
observer)

Smith v. Albemarle

1990

Forth

2:1

Crèche on front lawn of County Office Building with
sign reading "Sponsored by Charlottesville Jaycees"

Crèche
prohibited

Allegheny

ACLU v. Wilkinson

1990

Sixth

2:1

Stable and manger without figurines located on capitol
grounds (30ft decorated Christmas tree 100 located
yards away near decorated street lamps, lighted trees)

Stable
allowed

Allegheny
(reasonable
observer),
Lemon

Americans United v.
Grand Rapids

1992

Sixth

14:1

20 ft Menorah in a downtown public plaza

Menorah
allowed

Reasonable
Observer
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Case

Year

Circuit

Vote

Description of the Display

Ruling

Doctrine

Kreisner v. San Diego

1993

Ninth

2:1

8 religious scenes from the New Testament
accompanied by biblical passages, in a public park

Scene
allowed

Lemon,
Allegheny

Chabad-Lubavitch of
Georgia v. Miller

1993

Eleventh

11:0

15 foot tall Menorah in plaza in front of State Capital
building with sign "Happy Chanukah from Chabad of
Georgia"

Menorah
allowed

Nopreference,
reasonable
observer,
Widmar

AJC v. Beverly Hills

1996

Ninth

11:0

27 ft Menorah in public park near city hall with a sign
saying "This Menorah is Sponsored by Chabad of
California. It is Not Funded or Sponsored by the City
of Beverly Hills"

Menorah
prohibited

Unclearreferences
numerous
precedents

Elewski v. Syracuse

1997

Second

2:1

Crèche with a banner that says "Glory to God in the
Highest" at base of a 50 foot illuminated tree in a
downtown public square decorated with ornaments.
Across from this square is a Menorah display.

Crèche
allowed

Allegheny
(reasonable
observer)

Skoros v. NY

2006

Second

2:1

Crèche (in school where menorah and star and crescent
were allowed)

Not required
to display
crèche

Lemon
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Table 6.2 illuminates the erratic rulings in this category of cases.
Examining several of these cases sheds light on the problems judges faced and
the areas where they disagreed. In McCreary v. Stone in 1984, the Second
Circuit upheld a crèche that was privately owned and located in a public
park.97 The Village refused to allow a private group to construct a nativity
scene in the public park as it had done in past years.98 The Second Circuit held
that permitting the display would not violate the Establishment Clause,
referencing Lynch and refuting the Village’s claims that the displays in Lynch
and McCreary could be distinguished based on the physical context (the
inclusion of other objects).99 Rather, it focused on the “context of the
Christmas season.”100 In this way, the Second Circuit interpreted Lynch in the
broad sense, a pattern which continued with other cases.
Whereas the Second Circuit upheld the crèche in McCreary, in 1987
the Seventh Circuit ruled in American Jewish Congress v. Chicago that a
crèche located inside City Hall was unconstitutional.101 The display included a
nativity scene and a banner that stated “On Earth peace-Good Will toward
Men.”102 About 10-90 feet away the city displayed other objects, such as a
Christmas tree, Santa, reindeer, and disclaimer signs saying that the display

97

McCreary v. Stone 739 F.2d 716 (2nd Cir. 1984).
Id. at 719.
99
Id. at 728-29.
100
Id. at 728.
101
American Jewish Congress v. Chicago 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987).
102
Id. at 122.
98
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was not endorsed by the government.103 The Seventh Circuit, viewing only the
crèche and not the other symbols, struck down the crèche.
Unlike the Second Circuit, which adopted a broad view of Lynch, the
Seventh Circuit Judges in City of Chicago distinguished the display from
Lynch due to its location, inside the City Hall, and its solitary placement.104
Rather than part of the display located some feet away, the Court viewed the
crèche as solitary.105 After satisfying that the display was clearly different than
Lynch and therefore not subject to its precedent, the Court used Lemon to
judge the scene as a violation due to its message of government endorsement
of religion.106
Judge Easterbrook, dissenting in American Jewish Congress v.
Chicago, discusses the problems that Lynch created by forcing judges to look
at the contextual placement of the symbol. The issue with viewing the context
is that it turns a constitutional rule, which “identifies cases of concern and
prescribes outcomes for them” into a standard, which “identifies an
objective…and transfers to some other body the decisions about how much of
that value to achieve.”107 Therefore, the outcome of a case becomes dependent
on a judge’s view of the facts at hand. He criticizes Justice O’Connor’s

103

Id at 122-23.
Id. at 126.
105
Id. at 126.
106
Id. at 126-28.
107
AJC v. Congress, 827 F.2d 120 (1987), Easterbrook dissenting.
104
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“reasonable observer” test as a standard that changes the meaning of the text
by allowing judges to rule using their own prejudices. The real question is not
if “the members of this panel see this crèche as part of an integrated secular
display, but whether the reasonable people could see it so.”108
As an advocate for strict separation whose views fall in line with those
of Levy and Kurland, Easterbrook believes that government should have no
involvement with religion. Instead, judges should defer these issues to the
legislative branch. Although his position is on the far end of the spectrum, the
issue he presents is valid and encapsulates the fundamental problems with
judicial line-drawing. Easterbrook criticizes the Lynch majority for
“…requiring scrutiny more commonly associated with interior decorators than
with the judiciary.”109
These two cases illustrate the broader pattern and lack of consistency
representative of cases involving a solitary symbol. In six cases, a crèche or
menorah on public land was upheld as constitutional (McCreary, Elewski,
Grand Rapids, Kreisner, Wilkinson, Miller). In six cases, the crèche or
menorah was viewed as violating the Establishment Clause (Kaplan, Smith,
Birmingham, City of Chicago, Beverly Hills, and Skoros).

108
109

827 F.2d 120 (1987), Easterbrook dissenting.
827 F.2d 120 (1987), Easterbrook dissenting.
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6.3 Combined Displays
The remaining eight cases are classified as combined displays, which
are presented in Table 6.3.
Doe v. Clawson (6th Circuit 1990) 915 F.2d 244
ACLU v. City of St. Charles (7th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 265
Mather v. Village of Mundelein (7th Cir. 1989) 864 F.2d 1291
ACLU v. City of Florrisant (8th circuit 1999) 186 F.3d
Wells v. City and County of Denver (10th Circuit 2001) 257 F.3d 1132
Chabad-Lubavitch v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 109
Creatore v. Town of Trumbull (2nd Cir. 1995) 68 F.3d 59
ACLU v. Schundler (3d Cir. 1999) 168 F.3d 92/104 F.3d 1435
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Table 6.3: Circuit Court Rulings on Combined Displays of Religious Symbols.
Case

Year

Circuit

Vote

Description of the Display

Ruling

Doctrine

ACLU v. St Charles

1986

Seventh

3:0

Cross on top of the fire department, 35 feet high and 75
feet above street level (as part of a Christmas display
including lit trees, snowflakes, reindeer, Santa Clause)

Cross
prohibited

Schempp,
historical
analysis of the
Cross

Mather v. Mundelein

1989

Seventh

2:1

Nativity scene in public park with Christmas tree, Santa,
snowmen

Crèche allowed

AJC v.
Chicago, Lynch

Doe v. Clawson

1990

Sixth

3:0

Crèche on front lawn of city hall with evergreen trees with
lights, gifts, bows, Santa, and a "Noel" sign

Crèche allowed

Allegheny
(Blackmun)

Chabad-Lubavitch of
Vermont v. Burlington

1991

Second

3:0

Menorah in park at city hall alongside a secular display as
part of a combined holiday display

Menorah
allowed

Allegheny,
Kaplan

Creatore v. Trumbull

1995

Second

3:0

Crèche next to Christmas tree and menorah on town green

Crèche allowed

Allegheny

ACLU v. Schundler

1999

Third

2:1

Display allowed

Allegheny

ACLU v. Florissant

1999

Eighth

3:0

Crèche and menorah on city land in front of city hall
modified to include secular symbols
Crèche at City Civic Center part of a display with
"Seasons Greetings" sign, reindeer, candy canes, presents

Crèche allowed

Allegheny

Wells v. City and
County of Denver

2001

Tenth

2:1

Not required to
display poem

Citizens
Concerned,
Lemon

Poem (against religion) petitioned to be included in a
display of a Crèche, tin soldiers, Christmas tree, Santa,
snowmen on steps of City and County building
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These cases seem to support that a religious symbol combined with
secular objects will, by and large, pass constitutional evaluation. As seen by
Burlington, Creatore, and Schundler, these displays can include both crèches
and menorahs and still pass constitutional muster. The idea is that the
inclusion of secular objects mitigates the religious tones of the message
perceived by the reasonable observer. The result is a message of religious
pluralism, tolerance, and celebration of the history of the season, rather than a
government endorsement of religion. Judge Nelson aptly describes and
critiques this so called “St. Nicholas too” test or “plastic reindeer too” rule, in
his dissent in ACLU v. City of Birmingham, holding:
[A] city can get by with displaying a crèche if it throws in a sleigh full
of toys and a Santa Claus, too. The application of such a test may
prove troublesome in practice. Will a mere Santa Claus suffice, or
must there be a Mrs. Claus? Are reindeer needed? If so, will one do or
must there be a full compliment of eight? Or is it now nine.110
The ridiculousness of his questions embodies the sentiment of those against
such a rule, who question where to draw the line between secular and
religious. Critics also doubt that the presence of a Santa negates the religious
message inherent in a display like the crèche. As Daniel Parish maintains in
his article Private Religious Displays, “…more becomes better, or at least
safer…groups seeking to pass on a religious message are encouraged to cloak
it in quasi-secular trappings.”111

110
111

ACLU v. Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569.
Parish, 282.
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Supporters of this rule, such as George Janocsko, hold that it provides
a clear analytical framework, whereas the Allegheny precedent requires that
judges use an ad-hoc, case by case, line drawing method to decision
making.112 Justice Kennedy denounces the endorsement approach supported
by the majority in Allegheny, criticizing it as:
[J]urisprudence of minutiae. A reviewing court must consider whether
the city has included Santa’s, talking wishing wells, reindeer, or other
secular symbols as ‘a center of attention separate from the crèche’.113
This depicts the views of the many critics of this rule, who view it as a way to
pass constitutional scrutiny for a display that does actually endorse religion.
Justice Kennedy, though especially judgmental of this approach, accurately
describes shortfalls of this method when he mocks the Allegheny majority and
says, “This test could provide workable guidance to the lower courts, if ever,
only after this Court has decided a long series of holiday display cases, using
little more than intuition and a tape measure.”114
Despite the clear constitutional disagreement over this method, the
case data shows that it yields consistent results for combined religious-secular
displays. This could reasonably result from the fact that the importance of the
context of the display was emphasized in both Lynch and Allegheny. Both
cases stress that the physical setting and surroundings of the display are
fundamental to determining whether a reasonable passerby would view the

112

Janocsko, 487.
492 U.S. 573 at 674.
114
Id. at 673.
113
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scene as a governmental support of religion. Therefore, when a panel of
judges is presented with a case involving a scene that unambiguously includes
secular objects like snowmen, Santa Claus, and reindeer, they employ the
reasonable observer test, or the “Plastic Reindeer Too” Test, without
difficulty. Although the merits of this method may be disputed, it nonetheless
provides a clearer rule for judicial scrutiny. This diminishes the effect that
judicial preferences have on the outcome.
On the other hand, when a panel is required to determine the validity
of a claim against a free-standing Menorah, the judges are not equipped with
as clear a rule. They must embark on a distinction process to determine
whether the case at hand can be determined under the Lynch or Allegheny
precedent, or if a wholly different standard must be used. The various methods
result in different outcomes and allow judicial preferences to play a more
significant role in the decision making process. Whether the panel has judges
that favor a separation, accommodation, or neutral approach will play a bigger
part in the decision. Suddenly, the Christmas lights 100 yards away may be
included as part of the scene, but the Menorah across the street may be
excluded. The question of what a “reasonable observer” would perceive from
the scene is much harder to answer. By nature, it allows for judicial opinion to
enter into the decision. With panels randomly selected from a large pool of
diverse judges, it makes sense that the two groups vary so widely in terms of
consistency.

51

The issue then, is whether this variance can be resolved. An obvious
solution is to abandon the ad hoc approach currently utilized and create a
single, unifying theory for religious freedom cases. This does not seem
feasible considering the current division on the Court, and it may not be
desirable either. Even if the different ideologies of the justices could be
reconciled and a single test agreed upon, there will still remain significant
disagreement because of the Constitutional text itself. Beyond establishing a
national church, the Establishment Clause is devoid of absolutes. The issues
that the justices will have to resolve are not explicitly stated by an
undisputable source.
Further, a justice’s approach is inextricably tied to their preferences
and background. This division is portrayed by Justice White in his opinion in
Public Education v. Regan when he acknowledges, “But Establishment
Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among
ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the people
of this country.”115 For example, the extent to which a law affects religious
practice enough to be unconstitutional depends on where that judge draws the
line between belief and practice and how much of a hindrance it takes to cross
the line into the impermissible. Similarly, what counts as coercion will vary
based on how a judge perceives the effects of the law as well as the amount of

115

Everson v. Education 444 U.S. 646 (1980), 662.
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coercion necessary to invalidate a law. This applies to the definition of
religion and what could be considered to endorse a certain religion.
However, a single test may sacrifice liberty for consistency, which is
not desirable either. The Court recognizes that “There are always risks is
treating criteria discussed by the Court from time to time as ‘tests’ in any
limiting sense of the term. Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to
the absolutes of the physical sciences or mathematics.”116 Justice O’Connor
agrees with this and argues for an approach that does “more than erect a
constitutional ‘signpost,’ to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our
predilections may dictate. Instead, our goal should be ‘to frame a principle for
constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in the history and
language of the first amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent
application to the relevant problems.’”117 A test that is capable of changing as
times change, as O’Connor points out, shows a positive progression toward a
theory that fully embodies the First Amendment guarantees.

116
117

Tilton v. Richardson 403 U.S. 672 (1970), 679.
Wallace v. Jaffre 72 US 38 (1985), 69.
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7. Conclusions
The key issue that creates diverging rulings in these cases centers on
lack of a consistent means of interpretation. Neither the Lemon test nor the
endorsement test nor neutrality, non-coercion, nor strict separation provides
consistent results. Further, the precedent, especially the Allegheny opinions,
actually serve to create more variance across courts as different circuits adopt
different rules. Though this study cannot speak to other symbolic
Establishment Clause cases, it is reasonable that the troubles presented by
cases involving religious displays in the holiday context carry over to other
religious symbol cases. These include postings of the Ten Commandments,
public display of the cross, religious statutes, religious symbols on money,
city seals, and similar markings, and a range of others.
This underlines the shortcomings of the Establishment Clause and its
applicability to current day issues. The inability to develop methods for
interpreting holiday display cases, not to mention other types of religious
displays, has serious consequences. Without a clear test or doctrine to apply,
the lower courts decide cases based on their best interpretation of the
majority’s ruling. In the case of Allegheny, with at least four different opinions
offering four tests, lower courts have discretion regarding which test to apply.
The result has been incoherency across the circuits. This creates a different
standard of law across the nation. In some areas, a freestanding crèche is
permitted. In other areas, this fails to hold true, making it difficult for city
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leaders trying to plan the holiday display without incurring law suit fees that
can cripple its operations.
Lower courts have had the most disparity in cases that involve a
solitary display of a religious symbol. They tend to divide on what counts as
part of the display that will affect the viewer’s perceived message. On the
other hand, when presented with cases that combine secular and religious
symbols, they tend to uphold the display using the reasonable observer test.
This presents the question of whether this test adequately protects
Establishment Clause guarantees, calling into question whether a single
approach is possible. Justices in several cases have spoken to whether this is
feasible. The Court has refused to formally adopt any concrete test, which
“sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility [and] promises to be the
case until the continuing interaction between the States…produces a single,
more encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause.”118 The need
for the Supreme Court to elucidate a standard that is more substantive is
becoming increasingly important as the lower courts fracture in their
interpretations. While a single approach may not be likely, this analysis points
to the importance of making the First Amendment guarantees applicable to a
modern society in a way that upholds religious freedom while ensuring
uniformity in judicial outcomes across the United States.

118

Regan 444 U.S. 646 (1980) 662.
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Appendix 1: Case Set for Analysis

2nd Circuit:
McCreary v. Stone (2nd Cir. 1984) 739 F.2d 716 June 21, 1984
Board of Trustees v. McCreary 471 U.S. 83 March 27, 1985
Kaplan v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 1024 December 12, 1989
Chabad-Lubavitch v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 109 July 21, 1991
Creatore v. Town of Trumbull (2nd Cir. 1995) 68 F.3d 59 October 17, 1995
Elewski v. City of Syracuse (2nd Cir. 1997) 123 F.3d 51 August 14, 1997
Skoros v. New York (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1 February 2, 2006
3rd Circuit:
ACLU v. Schundler (3d Cir. 1999) 168 F.3d 92/104 F.3d 1435 February 16, 1999
4th Circuit:
Smith v. County of Albemarle (4th Circuit 1989) 895 F.2d 953 February 8, 1990
6th Circuit:
ACLU v. Birmingham (6th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 1561 June 11, 1986
ACLU v. Wilkinson (6th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1098 February 8, 1990
Doe v. Clawson (6th Circuit 1990) 915 F.2d 244 October 1, 1990
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids (6th
Circuit 1992) 980 F.2d 1538 November 16, 1992
7th Circuit:
ACLU v. City of St. Charles (7th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 265 June 6, 1986
American Jewish Congress v. Chicago (7th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 120 August 18, 1987
Mather v. Village of Mundelein (7th Cir. 1989) 864 F.2d 1291 January 4, 1989
8th Circuit:
ACLU v. City of Florrisant (8th circuit 1999) 186 F.3d August 16, 1999
9th Circuit:
Kreisner v. City of San Diego (9th Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 775 August 2, 1993
American Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills (9th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 379 July 19,
1996
10th Circuit:
Wells v. City and County of Denver (10th Circuit 2001) 257 F.3d 1132 July 2, 2001
11th Circuit:
Chabad Lubavitch of GA v. Miller (11th Cir. 1993) 976 F.2d 1386 October 18, 1993
Supreme Court:
Lynch v. Donnelly (S.C 1984) 465 U.S. 668 March 5, 1984
County of Allegheny v. ACLU (S.C. 1989) 492 U.S. 573 July 3, 1989
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Written Capstone Summary

This project explored one sub-sect of the First Amendment: religious
symbols displayed during the holiday season. Religious symbols are protected
as part of the religious freedom granted by the First Amendment to the
Constitution, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”119 These
phrases guarantee freedom from and of religion; that is, freedom from state or
Federal creation of a national church or declaration of a national religion and
freedom to practice religion without interference from state or federal
governments. Taken together, the establishment clause and free exercise
clause point in opposite directions. The establishment clause calls for a
separation of government and religion, requiring that government does not
sponsor one religion over another, or over irreligion. Whereas the free
exercise clause protects individuals from government interference with private
religious expression.120 For example, laws that grant exceptions for certain
religious practices are often challenged as government endorsements of
religion. However, denying such exemptions can result in prohibiting the free
exercise of religion. The result is a clash of the two clauses.
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The broad language of the establishment clause, combined with the
importance of religion in American culture and government provide an
inherent source of tension and confusion in constitutional interpretation. The
language of the clause is vague: Congress may not establish a religion, but
what defines a religion, what constitutes an establishment thereof, and what is
a law “respecting” such establishment? The role of religion historically
compounds this issue. Though America was founded on the principle of
religious freedom, government and religion have been intertwined throughout
American history. This is especially evident in the founding period: The
Declaration of Independence references a “Creator,” George Washington
declared that November 26th should be a day to give thanks and pray to the
Lord, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison supported such a “thanksgiving”
day and issued religious proclamations, Congress sessions begin with a
prayer, Court sessions open by saying “God save the United States and this
honorable Court,” the pledge of allegiance states that the U.S. is “one nation,
under God,” the national slogan is “In God We Trust.”121 This is not an
exhaustive list of governmental endorsements of religion from the founding
period. Plus, most of these practices still occur today.
These practices are a direct result of the fact that America was settled
by Protestants escaping religious persecution. As such, religious freedom was
a defining principle underlying the new government. However, in banning
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Congress from passing laws that sponsor or prohibit religious activities, the
settlers did not intend to banish every reference to God or religion by any
governmental institution. As a homogenously Protestant society, the religious
activities detailed above were not considered congressional legislation.
The inevitable confusion and disagreement over the precise meaning
of the Establishment Clause combined with the importance of religious liberty
calls for a clear, consistent method to determine Establishment Clause cases.
Regardless, the Court has failed to develop a reliable approach to analyze the
constitutionality and bounds of government involvement in religion. For over
sixty years the Court has regularly heard cases that claim violations of the
guarantees of the Establishment Clause, yet it has failed to produce a
framework for analysis that is generally applicable, gives coherent decisions,
and is agreed upon by the majority of the Court. Instead, Establishment Clause
doctrine is inconsistent with frequent changes in viewpoints, methodology,
tests, and defining principles underlying the clause.122
Government sponsorship of religious symbols is one area of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that has fueled substantial controversy
and constitutional debate. Private displays of religious symbols on public
property or publicly funded religious displays call into question whether the
government is endorsing a particular religion. This arises from the character of
religious symbols themselves, a central aspect of religious practice and a
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primary mechanism of conveying the beliefs of the religion. The issue is most
commonly seen in the inclusion of religious relics in displays that celebrate
official observances of holidays that have a religious origin.123 Nativity
scenes, or crèches, that celebrate Christmas, a federal holiday with religious
origins, are disputed most frequently. Christmas, and several other holidays of
religious origin, present problems because they have both secular and
religious elements. In a display with secular elements, such as a Santa Claus,
and religious elements, such as a nativity scene depicting the birth of Jesus, it
is often hard to establish the overall message emanating from the display.
Even displays of a Menorah without any secular objects can be viewed as a
secular celebration of the holiday depending on its placement. Thus, the issue
becomes complicated for cities, town, and private entities that wish to erect
displays on public property or using public funds.
Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989,
the only religious display cases decided by the Court on the grounds on
Establishment Clause violations, demonstrate the inadequacies of the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Bare majorities issued opposite rulings
for similar displays, opinions were numerous and obscure, and the members
of the Court vigorously disagreed with one another.
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Discord among the Court has serious implications for the judicial
system and for local governments. Discrepancy in methods, results, and
opinions threatens the credibility of the Court. This not only confuses the idea
of religious freedom, but it also threatens its very core. Additionally, it creates
inconsistency among circuit, district, and local courts across the nation. The
Supreme Court can hear a limited number of cases each year, so appellate
courts play a key role in ensuring implementation of the Court’s decisions and
consistency of federal law. With a narrow majority, varying results between
the two main cases, and multiple opinions all proposing substantially different
theories and tests, lower courts’ decision making process is compromised.
Considering that circuit and district courts are divided geographically and that
the Supreme Court can hear a miniscule fraction of the number of cases it
receives for appeal, there will be different standards across the nation for
religious displays based on the rulings of the courts in those regions.
Scholars and judges are highly critical of the Court’s rulings and agree
that they have resulted in conflicting rulings among the district and circuit
courts. However, there is scarce literature examining a large number of the
cases that have emerged in lower courts due to Lynch and Allegheny. This
leaves many important questions unanswered. Do Lynch and Allegheny
actually produce the degree of lower court chaos that many scholars depict?
Does variance come from a small number of courts issuing conflicting
decisions or are all courts similarly confused? When courts issue rulings that
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conflict with the precedent of the Supreme Court or of other lower courts,
what causes the clash? That is, what parts of the Lynch and Allegheny
decisions are most perplexing? In this thesis, I intend to embark on a review
of the Lynch and Allegheny progeny in order to provide substantive answers to
these questions.
The ninety four district courts, thirteen circuit courts, Supreme Court,
and state court systems create the universe of religious display cases.
Compiling circuit court rulings and analyzing the rulings provides a
manageable case set that will accurately depict the way lower courts have
responded to the Lynch and Allegheny decisions. This is because the Supreme
Court can decide a small number of cases each year, leaving the circuit court
as the highest authority for the majority of litigation. Circuit Courts become
the court of last resort for most disputes. Therefore, the rulings of the Circuit
Court provide the final say on cases involving displays of religious symbols in
the holiday context. A Sheppard’s Citation Search and LexisNexis Search
produced a set of 20 cases.
The 20 cases evaluated in this study were classified according to the
type of display. Two categories of cases emerged: displays of a single,
unattended religious symbol, such as a solitary crèche or menorah and
displays with one or more symbols, such as a menorah and Christmas tree,
included as part of a larger display with clearly secular symbols, such as a
reindeer, candy cane, or banner.
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There is clear inconsistency among Circuit Courts regarding cases of a
solitary symbol. In six cases, a crèche or menorah on public land was upheld
as constitutional (McCreary, Elewski, Grand Rapids, Kreisner, Wilkinson,
Miller). In six cases, the crèche or menorah was viewed as violating the
Establishment Clause (Kaplan, Smith, Birmingham, City of Chicago, Beverly
Hills, and Skoros). The results from combined cases support that a religious
symbol combined with secular objects will, by and large, pass constitutional
evaluation. For combined displays, the inclusion of secular objects mitigates
the religious tones of the message perceived by the reasonable observer. The
result is a message of religious pluralism, tolerance, and celebration of the
history of the season, rather than a government endorsement of religion. This
results from the importance of the context of the display that was emphasized
in Lynch and Allegheny. Therefore, when a panel of judges is presented with a
case involving a scene that unambiguously includes secular objects like
snowmen, Santa Claus, and reindeer, they employ the reasonable observer
test, or the “Plastic Reindeer Too” Test, without difficulty.
For unattended displays, the judges are not equipped with a clear rule.
They must embark on a distinction process to determine whether the case can
be decided under the Lynch or Allegheny precedent, or if a wholly different
standard must be used. Not only do these result in different outcomes, but they
also force the judges to investigate the display with more scrutiny. By nature,
it allows for judicial opinion to enter into the decision. Whether the panel has
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judges that favor a separation, accommodation, or neutral approach will play a
bigger part in the decision. And with panels randomly selected from a large
pool of diverse judges, it makes sense that the two groups are vary so widely
in terms of consistency. The overarching issue still remains that the Court
needs to provide better guidance for lower courts.
This project is significant because it is the first of its kind to compile
all of the case data together and organize it to shower meaningful patterns.
Though other scholars have discussed and compared some of these cases, I
have yet to come across a paper that systematically analyzes all of the
holiday-context religious display cases. Further, this study sheds light on the
reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s seemingly erratic decisions and seeks
to explain them in a way that validates the Court’s decisions. Hopefully, this
renews faith in the judicial process, which some people believe is broken, by
showing that discrepancies are a part of constitutional evolution and are
necessary as our county modernizes. There is a natural “lag time” between
societal changes and constitutional catch up. This project can be expanded in
the future to a wider Establishment Clause analysis which has the potential to
provide even more insight to understanding and protecting religious freedom.

